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The Public Use of Reason
A Philosophical Understanding of Knowledge Sharing
Maurizio Borghi, Italy
Abstract: Free access to knowledge and knowledge-sharing are among the most relevant claims of the so called ‘knowledge
society’, whose beginnings can be find out in the Age of Enlightenment. As a matter of fact, in the thinking of Immanuel
Kant these claims are explicitly assumed in a metaphysical perspective. Thus, the need of sharing knowledge, and in general
the need of freedom in the communication of thinking, is not merely held as self evident or just empirically given: on the
contrary, Kant asks about its transcendental meaning, and attempts to deduce this meaning a priori from the essence of
human being itself. However, this task is not systematically developed, but rather exposed en passant in different passages
of his work, where, facing phenomena such as the amazing expansion of book trade, the increasing diffusion of journals
and newspapers, the growing role of public opinion and the fierce fighting for freedom of press, Kant tries to demonstrate
their critical significance – and therefore also the threat they may represent – for the use of reason and thus for the mani-
festation of human nature as such. In this perspective, he elaborates the concept of the ‘public use of reason’, which will
represent the (more or less unspoken) canon for the present understanding of the modern society as a knowledge-based
society. The article analyses Kant’s thought on these topics, with particular reference to the concept of ‘enlightenment’ and
of the sense of access to knowledge in a philosophical perspective. Then it considers the misleading transformation of these
critical concepts in present day society as characterised by mass culture.
Keywords: Kant, Enlightenment, Knowledge Society, Freedom of Thinking, Mass Media
WE OFTEN SAY that we live in a‘knowledge society’. This widely usedexpression defines a world where scientif-
ic and technological knowledge play a
central and primary role, a role which has never
achieved such a level before. We speak of knowledge
workers and of knowledge itself as a primary re-
source or as “the most important raw material”. We
are therefore convinced that nowadays access to
knowledge is crucial not only for economic develop-
ment but also for democracy itself. In this line, the
call to promote knowledge sharing grows steadily
louder, since the access to knowledge represents the
crucial factor towards the creation of a definitively
fair and democratic world – a true “global cosmopol-
itan society”1.
What distinguishes this vision from the utopias
and the dreams which have populated the imagery
of the western world in the last centuries, is that this
vision’s realisation seems to actually be within reach.
We may say that never before has a vision appeared
to be substantiated by facts and reality. The most
relevant fact is represented by the Internet, “the
greatest technological revolution that our culture has
seen since the Industrial Revolution”2, the first “ar-
chitecturally free” mass media, so-called because it
is not externally adjustable. The most irrefutable
reality is that, thanks to the Internet, a world is rising
– as announced by Wikipedia founder Jimmy Wales
– “in which every single person on the planet is given
free access to the sum of all human knowledge”3. A
world in which the sum of all human knowledge is
easily available to everybody, by a simple mouse-
click, without any kind of barrier or censure.
In fact, the knowledge society, global and cosmo-
politan, seems to be taking root everywhere with its
incontrovertible power of the ‘reality of facts’. It re-
mains, however, to question the sense of this reality.
We may ask, for instance, if the meaning of what we
call ‘knowledge sharing’ deserves to be questioned
only as far as its technical implementation requires,
or if rather it justifies a deeper and more radical
questioning.
In this article, the following assertion will be dis-
cussed: the value which we nowadays call ‘know-
ledge sharing’ is the extreme deformation of a pure
philosophical insight, an insight which overshines
the whole of philosophical tradition and manifests
itself most brightly in the thinking of Immanuel Kant.
Moving from the Kantian concept of the public use
of reason, I will try to draw some indications in order
to understand the meaning of the present concerns
1 Anthony Giddens Runaway World. How Globalization is Reshaping our Lives, London: Profile Books, 1999, at 31.
2 Lawrence Lessig The Future of Ideas, New York: Vintage Books, 2002, at XXII.
3 Slashdot interview, July 28 2004 (http://interviews.slashdot.org).
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regarding knowledge sharing and accessing, and fi-
nally to shed some more light on what we call
‘knowledge society’4.
The western world began to become an ‘informa-
tion society’ during the 18th century5. Only two
hundred years after the invention of printing, the
circulation of books, journals and newspapers had
already reached, mainly in France and in England,
such a relevance that the way men related to each
other and communicated their knowledge had deeply
changed. Reading circles, literary and scientific
academies, coffee-houses, salons, spread out in cities
and towns. Music listening, poetry reading, pleasant
intellectual conversation and the exchange of artistic,
literary and scientific ideas became worldly activities
just like entertainment. There were many occasions
where, as Kant writes in the Critique of Practical
Reason, you could find yourself in the middle of
“mixed companies, consisting not merely of learned
persons and intellectuals, but also of men of business
or of women”. “When we attend to the course of
their conversation” – Kant adds ironically– “we ob-
serve that, besides story-telling and jesting, another
kind of entertainment finds a place in them, namely,
reasoning”6.
But what does reasoning in public mean? And, in
particular, what does it mean in the light of Kant’s
characterizations? What does the public handling of
thought imply? And more generally: what does it
mean to communicate your own thought by publish-
ing, i.e. to communicate it to an indefinite number
of persons, virtually extended to the whole world?
Instead of considering these phenomena as the
natural outcome of an age – of the ‘age of Enlighten-
ment’ as it was already called by its contemporaries
– Kant philosophically questions their sense. In this
line of questioning, ‘communication to the public’
is understood moving from the comprehension of
the very nature of man and thus grounded on its
metaphysical necessity.
In Kant’s view, a man who communicate with the
public is not merely expressing his authorship. He
is rather making a use of his own reason, and, more
precisely, he is making a ‘public use of reason’. This
wording is explained in the 1783 essay Answer to
the Question: What is Enlightenment?
By the public use of one’s reason I mean the
use which anyone may make of it as a learned
being before the whole reading world. Private
use I call that which one may make of it in a
particular civil post or office which is entrusted
to him7.
Some examples explain this difference: an officer
who has been given an order, cannot “openly debate
its suitability or usefulness: he must obey”. But as
a learned being he can make “remarks on errors in
the military service and lay them before the public
for judgment”. A citizen “cannot refuse to pay the
taxes imposed upon him”, but “as a learned being
he can publicly voice his thoughts on the impropriety
or even the injustice of these fiscal measures”. Sim-
ilarly a clergyman “is bound to instruct his pupils in
catechism conforming to the doctrine of the church
he serves”. But as a learned being “he has complete
freedom, even the calling, to impart to the public all
his carefully considered thoughts on the mistaken
aspect”8 of that doctrine.
What does Kant mean by “as a learned being” (als
Gelehrter)? We can find an answer in the Critique
of Pure Reason. In every cognition, in all human
knowledge, lies always a twofold possibility: on the
one hand it is an instrument used to obtain some
result, a skill serving the achievement of an aim; but,
on the other hand, in any cognition or knowledge,
independently of the aims for which it is de facto
plied, there is an element which does not depend on
its aims or on its empirical results, an element “in
which all men”, i.e. every human being as such,
“necessarily takes an interest”9. Kant states that in
the first case knowledge is meant according to the
“scholastic concept”, while in the second it is meant
according to the “worldly concept”, where “worldly”
means: regarding the “world”, i.e. every human being
as such – or, as Kant says in the Critique of Judge-
ment, “anyone who aims to be called ‘a man’”10.
Now, while it is always possible to learn every sci-
4 Here it is not a matter of ‘applying’ philosophical knowledge to present problems, in the same way as one applies a model to solve a
problem. Nor is it a matter of simply tracing the historical origins of the current problems in the philosophical tradition. Philosophy is
neither a tool for comprehension, nor a historical find. As Kant says, we can learn something from philosophy only by philosophizing, i.e.
only if we ourselves do philosophize (see Immanuel Kant Kritik von reinen Vernunft, A 837, B 865). In what follows, then, we shall have
to engage ourselves in the question that philosophy – namely Kant’s thought – diplays to us, without assuming an external point of view,
‘historical’ or ‘critical’ as it may be.
5 See Peter Burke A Social History of Knowledge, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000.
6 Immanuel Kant Kritik der praktischen Vernunft, A 269.
7 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung? in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, de Gruyter: Berlin/Leipzig,
1902, at 35.
8 Ibidem, at 35-6.
9 Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B 867 note.
10 Immanuel Kant Kritik der Urteilskraft, B 156. The distinction between “school” and “world” is developed in Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
A 839 fw., B 867 fw. In the Anthropology, Kant explicitly relates “scholastic knowledge” with the “lack of freedom in one’s own thought”
(A 139). Knowledge according to the worldly concept is world-wise knowledge, i.e. philosophy (on this existential concept of world see
Martin Heidegger, Einleitung in die Philosophie [1928/29], in Gesamtausgabe, Bd. 27, Klostermann: Frankfurt a/M, 2001, at 301-3).
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ence, and even philosophy, according to the scholast-
ic concept (which, in the case of philosophy, pro-
motes a “historical learning”), there is no school able
to teach any knowledge according to Kant’s worldly
concept. The use of worldly knowledge cannot be
reduced to the mere acquisition of even wide and
erudite cognitions, nor to their spreading and sharing;
it uniquely consists in the free use11 of such cogni-
tions in order to accomplish aims for which there are
no schools nor instructors, only “an ideal teacher,
who employs all those cognitions as instruments for
the advancement of the essential aims of human
reason”12. Now, the “essential aims” of human
reason lie in the dimension Kant terms “transcend-
ental” (“beyond any experience”13) whose extension
is defined by the three fundamental questions in
which “the whole interest of reason” is centred:
1. What can I know?
2. What ought I to do?
3. What may I hope?14
Man “as a learned being” is not meant by Kant as
indicating a particular profession or a status – for
instance the category which is nowadays called ‘the
intellectuals’. It is rather a human way of being vis-
à-vis knowledge, and such a way of being can arouse
and arise in every domain of knowledge. The learned
being has freed himself from the “school”, has
jumped beyond the empirical dimension towards the
freedom of transcendence, bringing himself to the
full exercise of his own thinking. While the private
use of reason corresponds to the execution of an ex-
ternally entrusted duty, and therefore is not a free
use, the public use of reason is the very exercise of
freedom, and as such it can only be limited by the
bond of reason itself:
The use which an appointed indoctrinator
[Lehrer] makes of his reason before his congreg-
ation is purely private […]; with respect to it,
he is not free, nor can he be free, because he
carries out the orders of another. But as a
learned being [Gelehrter], whose writings speak
to a public, i.e. to the world at large, in the
public use of his reason he enjoys unlimited
freedom to use his own reason to speak in his
own person15.
But how can this unlimited freedom be justified? We
have already seen that the public use of reason is a
way of exercising thinking, i.e. human freedom.
Now, what distinguishes thinking from all other hu-
man ‘activities’ is the fact that it can be totally free
only when it is somehow exercised in common with
other men, i.e. when it is shared. Kant fully develops
this topic in the second part of the Critique of Pure
Reason, namely in the Transcendental Doctrine of
Method where he elaborates the “formal conditions
of a complete system of the pure reason”16. The
freedom of “publicly exposing to [the others’]
judgement one’s own thoughts and doubts that one
cannot resolve by oneself”17 is one of these formal
conditions. In Kant’s view ‘thought’, in line with the
tradition, always means ‘judging’18. But a judgement
is true when it is correct, i.e. only when it is in ac-
cordance with the object on which it is formulated.
Now, communication to the others is a means – even
though only subjective – to test the correctness of
one’s own judgement (the accordance with the ob-
ject) through the accordance with the judgements of
others (which, if the judgement is correct, will also
be in accordance with the same object):
For in this case [not the certainty, but] the pre-
sumption, at least, arises that the agreement of
all judgements with each other, in spite of the
different characters of the subjects, rests upon
the common ground of the agreement of each
with the object, and thus the correctness of the
judgement is established.19
In the Anthropology we can find the same principle,
explicitly related to the freedom of the press:
It is so certain that we cannot give up this means
[consisting of submitting one’s own judgment
to the others’ intellect] of assuring ourselves of
the correctness of our own judgment, that this
is perhaps the principal reason why learned
people fight so hard for the freedom of the press.
If this freedom is denied, we would thereby lose
a very potent means for proving the correctness
11 “Free use”, here, means “world-wise”, i.e. a “philosophical” use.
12 “Him alone can we call philosopher”, Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 839, B 867.
13 Ibidem, A 464, B 492.
14 Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 805, B 833. In the Logikvorlesung a fourth question, “to which the other three aim”, is
added: “What is man?” (A 25; see François Fédier Regarder Voir, Les Belles Lettres/Archimbaud: Paris 1998, at 122)
15 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 37.
16 Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 707-6, B 735-6.
17 Ibidem, A 752, B 780.
18 “We can reduce all acts of understanding to judgements, so that understanding may be represented as the faculty of judging. For it is,
according to what has been said above, a faculty of thought.” (Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 69, B 84). Judging means
connecting a predicate to a subject in the form ‘S is P’.
19 Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 821-1, B 848-9.
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of our own judgments and we would be left to
error20.
The freedom of the press is a condition for the prac-
tice of the public use of reason. The unlimited free-
dom of which the latter benefits is justified by the
need for man to be free from error and, thus, to be
in the truth. Man cannot call himself completely free
as long as he is left to err. To be left to err is a partic-
ularly insidious lack of freedom, because it can easily
appear as freedom itself and can be taken as such.
There are several ways of being left to err, but there
is a specific one where man is not only fundamentally
in error, but is even unable to feel the need for truth:
in such a situation he is deprived of the very possib-
ility of distinguishing truth from error, and is there-
fore in a state of indifference to both. Here thinking
(judging) no longer has any other function than that
of satisfying empirical needs. Man can give up
thinking, since, for the empirical necessities to which
it is devoted, he can hand such an ‘activity’ over to
someone else – he can practice the outsourcing of
thinking, as we might currently say. In his essay on
enlightenment, Kant terms this condition Un-
mündigkeit, “a state of tutelage”, and its motto reads:
“I need not think, if I can only pay; others will easily
take this irksome job over for me”21. The public use
of reason is the sphere where man can free himself
from the apparent freedom of this self-incurred tutel-
age. Man’s release from tutelage is exactly what Kant
calls enlightenment.
For any single individual, to work himself out
of this state of tutelage, which has become al-
most his nature, and of which he has even come
to be fond, is very difficult. […] Dogmas and
formulas, those mechanical tools of the rational
employment or rather misemployment of his
natural endowments, are the fetters of an ever-
lasting tutelage. […] But that a public should
enlighten itself is more than possible; indeed,
if only freedom is granted, enlightenment is al-
most inevitable22.
We can see how Kant’s understanding of enlighten-
ment is path-breaking and not comparable to any of
the views of his contemporaries, nor to our usual
way of understanding it. First of all, for Kant enlight-
enment is not a historical concept, a ‘process’ in
which men of a given age are somehow involved, a
change which can be described, for instance, with
Fontenelle’s words: “A brand new philosophic esprit
has recently spread out, a light which had not en-
lightened our ancestors”23. Enlightenment is rather
for Kant the name of a fundamental way of being
human, in which man has the courage to use his own
intellect. And this way has to be continually
achieved, it is never acquired once and for all: it is
a task each generation has to carry out again and
again, a task with respect to which our generation is
never ahead compared to “our ancestors”.
Similarly, the public use of reason, as an essential
condition for enlightenment, is not a sociological
concept, and thus has nothing to share with what we
nowadays call ‘public opinion’ – indeed it is not a
question of expressing an opinion; rather it is a matter
of being in the truth 24. Kant’s enlightenment cannot
be understood by moving from a historical, political
or even sociological plane25. As a matter of fact he
writes:
A [political] revolution may perhaps accomplish
the fall of personal despotism and of tyrannical
or power-seeking oppression, but it can never
enhance a true reform in the way of thinking.
Instead, new prejudices will serve as well as
old ones to harness the great unthinking
masses26.
Kant opposes to political revolution a “reform in the
way of thinking” (Reform der Denkungsart) – a
sentence recalling the explicit aim of the Critique of
Pure Reason. In the Preface to the second edition,
Kant explains this reform as the necessary condition
in order that thinking no longer “keeps on groping
its way out” "but "strikes into the sure path of sci-
ence”27. After what we have said about the “worldly”
meaning of science, it would be reductive to read
20 Immanuel Kant Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, A 128-9.
21 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 33.
22 Ibidem, at 34. Unmündigkeit in explained in the Anthropology as the “natural or legal incapacity of a man, even though in good health,
to use his own intellect in civil affairs”, and this incapacity is specifically termed Minderjährigkeit, “minority”, when “it is grounded
on the age immaturity” (Immanuel Kant Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht, A 208).
23 Quoted in Antonio Santucci Interpretazioni dell’Illuminismo, Il Mulino: Bologna, 1979.
24 Opinion (Meinung) is for Kant the lowest degree of “holding to be true”: it is “a conscious holding-to-be-true, which is insufficient both
subjectively and objectively” (Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, A 822, B 850). A “public opinion”, i.e. a doubly insufficient
holding-to-be-true passively shared by everybody, could only be termed by Kant Aberglaube, “superstition” (see Kritik der Urteilskraft,
B 158-9). According to this, Habermas’ reading of Kant’s Öffentlickeit as an essential step in the construction of the “sphere of the bourgeois’
public opinion”, appears totally mistaken (see Jürgen Habermas Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit. Untersuchungen zu einer Kategorie
der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft. Luchterhand : Neuwied-Berlin, 1962).
25 For a political reading of Kant’s notion of enlightenment see for instance Onora O’Neill “The Public Use of Reason”, Political Theory,
14, 1986 (interpreting toleration toward public use of reason as a means of building a self-regulating system of shared rationality).
26 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 35.
27 Immanuel Kant Kritik der reinen Vernunft, B XV.
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these sentences only in an epistemological sense. If
science regards every human being as such, the re-
form of the way of thinking, and thus enlightenment,
is a transformation of the entire human being.
Kant’s enlightenment cannot therefore be reduced
neither to an epistemological notion. It is rather a
wholly philosophical concept, and as such it cannot
be understood outside philosophy itself. It echoes
what, in Plato’s thinking, and throughout the philo-
sophical tradition which follows, is termed ‘eidetic
sight’. The release of men from tutelage is a move-
ment comparable to that, which in Plato's simile of
the cave (Politeia, 7th book), leads the human being
from the state of captivity to the freedom of seeing
into ‘the most un-concealed’ (to alethéstaton)28, i.e.
into ideas. To accomplish this movement is the aim
of paideia, i.e. ‘education’ in the sense of the periag-
ogè holes tes psyches: the guidance in the
(trans)forming of the entire human being in his core.
In such a metamorphosis, man experiences a radical
change of his own ‘being in the truth’, a change by
which what appeared as the only real dimension of
truth, reveals itself as the realm of the most wicked
appearances, i.e. of the absolute ‘un-truth’. Paideia
displays itself in a constitutive nexus with aletheia,
the truth, since the latter marks its path and rhythm,
and orients its whole movement29. Aletheia marks
the motion of paideia, primarily in the sense of a
fight against one’s own apaideusia, a fight which
must continually be fought and in which man is al-
ways engaged. The prisoner released from the cave
only slowly and with difficulty, “feeling pain and
anger”30, gets used to the sight of the things outside
the cave, in the light of the sun; similarly, the minor
freed from tutelage, only with great difficulty starts
taking his first steps on his own, “because he is not
accustomed to that kind of free motion”. “Therefore
– continues Kant – there are few who succeed in
freeing themselves from tutelage by their own exer-
cise of mind and in achieving a steady pace”31.
Enlightenment is the freeing of man, the beginning
of a possible ‘being in the truth’, where truth, how-
ever, is no longer aletheia, unconcealment, but cor-
rectness of judgement, i.e. accordance of the judge-
ment with the object. The public use of reason, as a
dimension free from empirical concerns, or, as we
might say, ‘empiric free zone’, where correctness of
judgement can be submitted to scrutiny, corresponds
to that synousia peri to pragma auto – “to be together
by the thing itself” – which Plato, in the well-known
passage of the Seventh Letter, indicates as the neces-
sary condition for a spark called “philosophy” to
light in man’s mind enlightening it32.
Paideia, as metamorphosis of the apaideusia, re-
mains in a constitutive liaison with this latter, to such
an extent that the movement of paideia cannot be
considered to be wholly accomplished without the
“return journey into the cave”33. Similarly, every
single man’s enlightenment involves the task of the
Volksaufklärung, the enlightenment of all those who
are still caught in the state of minority:
To enlighten the people means to publicly in-
struct them in their duties and rights vis-a-vis
the state to which they belong. Since only nat-
ural rights and rights arising out of the common
human understanding are involved, their true
natural heralds and interpreters among the
people are not lawyers officially appointed by
the state, but free jurists, i.e. philosophers, who,
precisely because of this freedom they allow
themselves, are a scandal for the state, which
wants only to keep under submission, and they
are decried, under the name of enlighteners, as
persons dangerous for the state34.
They are “persons dangerous for the state” because
they threaten the status quo, the peaceful and quiet
staying under tutelage. “And should someone try to
release them and lead them out [of the cave], could
they get hold of him and kill him, don’t you think
they would?”35 – thus ends Plato’s simile.
The ways and the means of hindering and stopping
the work of those “dangerous persons”, who, in every
time, provoke “scandal” and whom one would will-
ingly kill, are many and difficult to foresee. Kant
often goes back to this matter to explore it more
deeply and define it more completely. In the article
What does it Mean to Orient oneself in Thinking ?,
28 Plato Politeia, 484 c.
29 This constitutive nexus between paideia and aletheia was discovered and interpreted by Martin Heidegger (see “Platons Lehre von der
Wahrheit” [1931/32, 1940] in Wegmarken, Klostermann: Frankfurt a/M, 1976). When Plato speaks of the way men can be led from the
darkness of the cave to the light (phos), he carefully distinguishes this motion from a mere revolution: “It is not like turning a shell upside
down, but it is a transforming of the human being in his essence (psychés periagoge), a translation from an almost nightly day to the clear
day where beings unconceales themselves in their being – and this translation is what we call ‘true philosophy’, i.e. philosophy committed
to unconcealement (philosophia alethé).” (Politeia, 521 c).
30 Plato Politeia, 516 a.
31 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 34.
32 See Plato Seventh Letter, 341 c-d.
33 Plato Politeia, 516 e.
34 Immanuel Kant Die Streit der Fakultäten, in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VII, de Gruyter: Berlin/Leipzig, 1902, at 254.
35 Plato Politeia, 517 a.
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written two years after the essay on enlightenment,
Kant distinguishes three fundamental forms of oppos-
ition to the “freedom of thinking”36. The first one is
“social coercion”, that is to say censorship, the clos-
ure of public spaces, the despotic deprivation of the
freedom of speech and of the press. We could say
they are all means of acting ‘from the outside’, which
remove or limit the material conditions of the public
use of reason. But there are also less evident, and
consequently more efficacious means, which do not
need to deny the public use of reason, because they
– in a subtle way – prevent it from taking place. By
those means the public use of reason corrupts ‘from
the inside’, through its distorted use. Kant calls this
second way “the coercion of consciousness”. As
previously seen, the condition of tutelage derives its
strength from the false principle according to which
others can think in one’s own place. Showing this
step towards the release from tutelage as being “not
only difficult, but also very dangerous”, is the busi-
ness of “those guardians” who “so kindly assume
superintendence”37 over the people. These guardians
are themselves “unfit for any enlightenment”; they
are only able to spread “statutes and formulas” (“the
fetter of an everlasting tutelage”), to sow the “seeds
of prejudices”38, moved by “the anxious fear of the
danger of an autonomous questioning”39. And since
they show themselves as the ones to whom that
“irksome work” which is thinking has been handed
over, they appear as philosophers, although they are
not philosophers at all, because – as we have just
seen – the very task of philosophy is to enlighten,
i.e. to make each human being able to think by him-
self, in the widest freedom. In the age of ‘publicity’,
the guardians play the role that in the Greek polis
was played by the sophists, that is to say, as Plato
writes in Politeia, “to instruct men to know nothing
but what everybody wants to know (ta ton pollon
dogmata)”, an instruction they call “the highest
knowledge (sophia)”40.
When the public use of reason is thus distorted, a
peculiar deformation of what is meant by “freedom
of thinking” occurs. A third way of hindering think-
ing arises. It is the “lawless use of reason”, the use
of a reason “unwilling to submit itself to the law it
gives to itself”41. The kind of freedom thinking be-
lieves to have thus achieved is actually the shiftiest
slavery, because reason, deprived of its own law and
of the boundaries it gives to thinking, ends up by
“totally submitting itself to facts”. Once this submis-
sion has taken place, the explicit opposition to the
freedom of thinking actually becomes superfluous,
since thinking is by now deprived of its proper ele-
ment. Empirical concerns have somehow dried up
transcendence. Thinking (i.e. judgement), which as
such cannot give up a criterion of correctness, and
can only look for an accordance (of the judgement
it consists of) with the thing itself (to which judge-
ment refers), finds no “object” before itself other
than “exterior facts endorsed by evidences”42, and,
still trusting to find there an orientation, ends up by
totally submitting itself to them. Thus begins an age
where thinking is uniquely and peremptorily
summoned to the ground of “facts”, and where all
knowledge is at the service of this peremptory sum-
moning43.
Kant’s concept of the public use of reason leads
us into what we nowadays call the ‘knowledge soci-
ety’. If, as I have tried to show, what Kant says about
enlightenment is essentially philosophical, and
therefore “new each day”44, then we should be able
to recognize it in our present condition as well. We
should still find today the way to ask the same ques-
tion Kant asked two centuries ago, that is: is our age
enlightened?45
In order to at least lay the ground for an answer,
I think we must start by asking what is actually
‘knowledge’ in our age – an age which conceives
itself as a ‘knowledge society’. As noted above, this
expression commonly means that knowledge is cur-
rently the ‘main resource’, and that the freedom of
accessing and sharing it is the most fundamental
value we have to promote. Thanks to Kant’s analysis
we can now spot a peculiar ambiguity in this com-
mon understanding. This ambiguity corresponds,
somehow, to the distinction Kant highlights between
knowledge according to the scholastic concept and
knowledge according to the worldly concept. As we
36 Immanuel Kant Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren? in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, de Gruyter: Berlin/Leipzig, 1902, at
145.
37 Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 33.
38 Ibidem, at 34.
39 Immanuel Kant Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren?, supra note 36, at 146.
40 Plato Politeia, 493 a.
41 Immanuel Kant Was heißt sich im Denken orientieren?, supra note 36, at 146.
42 Ibidem.
43 “It is rather easy to root enlightenment in single subjects through education [Bildung] […] But it is very difficult to enlighten an age.”
(Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 34). On the submission of thinking to facts see also Über
den Gemeinspruch: Das mag in der Theorie richtig sein, taugt aber nicht für die Praxis in Kant’s gesammelte Schriften, vol. VIII, de
Gruyter: Berlin/Leipzig, 1902, at 273-314.
44 See Heraclitus, fragm. 6. The characteristic of a philosophical question is that it never becomes ‘out of date’.
45 Kant’s answer is: “no, but it certainly is an age where an enlightenment is possible” (Immanuel Kant Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist
Aufklärung?, supra note 7, at 40). Today our matter is to question about this possibility.
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have seen, in the public use of reason we are
primarily concerned with the latter, and this means:
public use of reason is never merely a matter of
sharing and spreading scholastically acquired no-
tions, but a question of the free use of those notions
in order to accomplish “the essential aims of human
reason”, i.e. to accomplish transcendence.
When we look at knowledge as 'main resource' or
raw material, we are implicitly articulating its
scholastic concept – where, however, ‘school’ is no
longer simply the depository of practical and dogmat-
ically applicable know-how, but, so to say, the store
of specialized knowledge from which to draw in or-
der to carry out all kinds of performance.
When we speak about ‘knowledge sharing’ we
are instead articulating the ‘worldly’ concept. But
here too lies an essential difference: the ‘orientation’
is no longer the “world”, the “reading world”
(Weltleser), the sphere that essentially transcends
the thinking subject, the pure and simple transcend-
ence; what is targeted is now rather the indistinct
mass of ‘individuals’ composing ‘society’, the
‘global society’, an empirical sum of users and con-
sumers of knowledge46.
In this condition, what we know and the way we
come to know it is far less relevant than the fact of
being ‘in the know’, a ‘know’ as far as possible easy
to draw from and to share. By now, the primary call
of every scholar is to make the access to knowledge
– both ‘scientific’ and ‘humanistic’ – as easy as
possible. A new kind of ‘guardians’ carefully inter-
pret this calling. It is not only journalists and profes-
sional popularizers, but, as Hannah Arendt asserts:
a special kind of intellectual, often well-read
and well-informed, whose sole function is to
organize, disseminate, and change cultural ob-
jects in order to make them palatable to those
who want to be entertained or – and this is
worse – to be ‘educated’, that is, to acquire as
cheaply as possible some kind of cultural
knowledge to improve their social status47.
The public dimension is no longer the sphere in
which the correctness of judgement can be submitted
to scrutiny; it is the place where the ‘intellectuals’
in charge uniformly spread an already-manufactured
and packaged judgement. With this “special kind of
intellectual” a new form of Kant’s “dogmatic sleep”
arises. It consists of considering science only with
regards to its results, culture only according to its
effects, and both only as valuable factors in the per-
spective of their social utility. This is a dogmatism,
because it reduces the access to knowledge to an
entirely un-problematic dimension, where it can ap-
pear only according to a standard perspective, inflec-
ted in a wide range of patterns – and, according to
Hannah Arendt, when the world “is permitted to
present itself in only one perspective”, “the end of
the common world has come”48.
This standard perspective is the fulfillment of so-
cial needs. What is relevant is no longer the truth of
knowledge, but its capacity for complying with the
necessities of society. Journals and newspapers, as
possible instruments of the public use of reason, turn
into real devices for establishing the standard per-
spective. As a means of a possible enlightenment,
they turn into effective mechanisms for keeping men
under tutelage. This ‘realization’, whose first effects
were experienced by Kant himself49, is nowadays
accomplished to such an extent that ‘mistrusting’
journals and newspapers has become commonplace.
The harmfulness of this situation consists in the fact
that – as Simone Weil clearly saw fifty years ago –
“one feels almost afraid to read” and that “one reads
as though he were drinking from a contaminated
well”:
The public is suspicious of newspapers, but its
suspicions don’t save it. Knowing, in a general
way, that a newspaper contains both true and
false statements, it divides the news up into
these two categories, but in a rough-and-ready
fashion, in accordance with its own predilec-
tions. It is thus delivered over to error50
‘Predilections’, according to which the public orients
its suspicious reading, are in their turn oriented and
determined by the reading of journals, which – ac-
cording to Martin Heidegger – “set public opinion
to swallowing what is printed, so that it becomes
ready, on demand, to receive a set configuration of
opinion”51.
In recent years, this contaminating guardianship
of journals seems to be tottering under the pressure
of the so called ‘new media’ and their capacity for
spreading knowledge by bypassing the control of the
46 According to Hannah Arendt, “society”, as formed on an agreement of interests, is a way of instituting men’s being together which leaves
out any relationship to the “world”, i.e. to transcendence. Mass society is the accomplishment of the “wordlessness” (See Hannah Arendt
The Human Condition, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1958, at 54).
47 Hannah Arendt “Society and Culture”, Dedalus, 1960, at 285.
48 Hannah Arendt The Human Condition, supra note 46, at 55.
49 See Immanuel Kant Philosophical Correspondence 1759-1799, ed. Arnulf Zweig, University of Chicago Press: Chicago, 1967, in par-
ticular the letter of 7th august 1783 to Ch. Garve, where he discusses the way journals have publicly treatened the Critique of Pure Reason.
50 Simone Weil The Needs for Roots, Routledge: New York/London, at 36-7.
51 Martin Heidegger Vorträge und Aufsätze, Günther Neske / Cotta: Stuttgart, 2000 [1954], at 22.
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‘guardians’52. However, as long as knowledge is not
understood in its “worldly concept”, even though
knowledge sharing is effectively implemented
through “architecturally free media” such as the In-
ternet, man will firmly be kept in his “state of tutel-
age”, that is, at the bottom of the “cave”. But the
worldly concept can shine only where a world is.
Now, no world can be without transcendence. In our
age, which is caught in the grip of urgencies and
needs, to be men of knowledge means to give full
scope to the transcendence, that is to the ‘empiric
free zone’ where those devoted to thinking – without
being peremptorily summoned on the ground of
‘facts’ and of ‘results’ – may publicly communicate
“without being decried on that account as turbulent
and dangerous citizens”53. Or, even worse, as being
socially useless.
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